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THE LIE DETECTOR IN COURT
JOHN E. REID
THE result of the everyday court case ultimately is based upon
which of the opposing parties to the lawsuit is lying or telling
the truth. The judge in non-jury cases employs lie detection
constantly by observing and determining the manner in which the
witnesses answer their questions. The jury studies the witnesses and
their testimony to determine which witness to believe and which one
not to believe. The whole art of cross-examination has a fundamental
purpose to expose the liar. Documentary evidence as well as all other
physical evidence is introduced to substantiate the truthfulness of the
allegations of the parties to the lawsuit. Why then do the courts
frown on the use of scientific lie detection as court evidence?
It is conceded by the courts that the lie-detector technique need
not be infallible in its indications in order to obtain admissibility as
evidence but need only to show that the proponents of the lie detec-
tor believe the instrument to have a reasonable measure of precision
and accuracy and that it is an accepted technique in the particular
profession or field of science to which it belongs.' What then is the
attitude of the courts regarding the lie detector?
The first appellate court decision regarding lie-detector evidence
was rendered in 1923, in the federal court case of Frye v. United
States.2 The accused, who was on trial for murder, offered as evidence
the results of a Marston "systolic blood pressure test"3 to prove his
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed., 1940) § 990.
2 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C., 1923).
3 In 1918 Villiam Moulton Marston of Harvard recorded respiration and a dis-
continuous systolic blood pressure in deception. Marston measured the subject's sys-
tolic blood pressure before asking the crime question and then made a second read-
JoHN E. REID, Director of John E. Reid and Associates, is a graduate of De Paul
University College of Law and a foremost authority in the field of lie detection.
He is co-author, with Fred E. Inbau, of the third edition of Lie Detection and Crimi-
nal Interrogation (1953). Mr. Reid made two major contributions to the field of lie
detection. In 1945 he discovered that blood pressure responses during lie-detector tests
could be falsified and he devised and patented the Reid Polygraph to detect efforts
by the subject to falsify his lie-detector responses. In 1947 he revised and modified
the questioning technique in lie-detector tests by adding control questions and thereby
reducing the possibility of errors during the test.
31
51 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
innocence and the lower court refused to accept the testimony of
Marston to substantiate the defendant's claim. Upon appeal the ruling
that the lie-detector evidence was inadmissible was affirmed, and the
reviewing court offered as its reason the following opinion:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the ex-
perimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from
a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
We think the systolic blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological au-
thorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced
from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made.
4
In 1933 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in State v. Bohner5 was
again confronted with the problems as to whether lie-detector test
results were admissible as evidence. In this case the defendant offered
to prove his innocence of a robbery charge by introducing lie-
detector test results which indicated he was telling the truth when he
denied committing the robbery. The trial court ruling that the lie-
detector test results were inadmissible was upheld by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court. The court expressed the view that the time was not
yet here when lie-detector test results should be used as evidence. It
held that although the instrument (a Keeler Polygraph):'
... may have some utility at present, and may ultimately be of great value in
the administration of justice . .. a too hasty acceptance of it during this stage
of its development may bring complications and abuses that will overbalance
whatever utility it may be assumed to have.
7
ing of the blood pressure after the question was asked. He then compared two blood
pressure readings and if significant variances were noted in the readings he concluded
deception was attempted. This technique was cumbersome because it required manu-
ally inflating the blood pressure cuff before and after each question.
4 Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013, 1014 (D.C., 1923).
5 210 Wis. 651, 246 N.. 314 (1933).
6 Leonarde Keeler developed the Keeler Polygraph in 1929 which made a continu-
ous recording of blood pressure, pulse and respiration. Keeler did not invent the lie
detector but made further refinements in the instrumentation which followed the
work of Dr. John Larson of Berkeley, California, in 1926.
7 State v. Bohner, 210 WVis. 651, 654, 246 N.,V. 314, 317 (1933).
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Although ten years elapsed between the Frye case and the Bohner
case, and although the Keeler Polygraph and the Keeler technique8
constituted a tremendous scientific advancement over the outmoded
Marston instrument and technique, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
showed the same wariness in accepting lie-detector test results as did
the Federal Court in the Frye case in 1923.
This same wariness was indicated in a 1942 Michigan case, People
v. Becker.9 In a manslaughter trial the defendant offered in evidence
the results of lie-detector tests which indicated that he killed the de-
ceased in self-defense. The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible
and his ruling was sustained by the Michigan Supreme Court on the
grounds that there was no testimony in the case to show that there
exists at the present time "a general scientific recognition of such
tests."' The opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court was that "until
it is established that reasonable certainty follows from such tests it
would be error to admit in evidence the results thereof.""
Insofar as the law reports reveal, the first time that a trial court ad-
mitted lie-detector test results over the objection of defense counsel
was in the 1947 Kansas case of State v. Lowry.12 The trial court per-
mitted the introduction of lie-detector test records of both the com-
plaining witness and the defendant who was accused of a felonious
assault, but the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the trial court's con-
viction and held that the lie-detector technique has not yet gained
sufficient recognition to warrant the acceptance of test results as com-
petent legal evidence. At the same time, however, the court pointed
out that its holdings should not be interpreted as discrediting the lie
detector "as an instrument of utility and value, 1l 3 since its usefulness
has been amply demonstrated by detective agencies, police depart-
ments, and other law enforcement agencies conducting criminal in-
vestigations.
Twenty-six years elapsed after the Frye case decision in 1923 be-
s Keeler's greatest contribution was the introduction of the questioning, technique
whereby both relevant (questions about the crime) and irrelevant questions (non-
pertinent questions used only to establish a norm) are asked and answered by either
"yes" or "no." A comparison of the responses indicates whether deception is at-
tempted.
9300 Mich. 562, 2 N.W. 2d 503 (1942).
10 Ibid., at 564 and 505. 12 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947).
11 Ibid. ia Ibid., at 626 and 151.
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fore even a single appellate court judge would venture to suggest that
lie-detector test results should be admitted as evidence. In a 1949 deci-
sion the Supreme Court of Nebraska in Boeche v. State14 affirmed the
decision of a trial court in refusing to allow the defendant (accused
of cashing bogus checks) to offer in evidence the testimony of a lie-
detector examiner regarding the results of tests made on the defendant,
which tests, in the opinion of the examiner, indicated the defendant's
innocence of the offense. In reversing the case on other grounds the
majority of the Nebraska Supreme Court were of the opinion that the
trial court was correct in its rejection of the lie-detector evidence.
They thought that if such evidence were admitted, "the vital function
of cross-examination would be impaired"; 15 that while the examiner
could be cross-examined regarding his qualifications and the proce-
dures used, "the machine itself ...escapes all cross-examination."' 6
In addition to this rather vague objection about cross-examination
"impairment", the majority of the court thought that the evaluation
of lie-detector test results was "too subtle a task to impose upon an
untrained jury."'17 They also found that the test had "not yet received
general scientific acceptance,' '1 8 and that "experimenting psycholo-
gists themselves admit that a wholly accurate test is yet to be per-
fected."'19 However, one member of the Nebraska Court, Justice
Chappell, thought that the time had arrived for the judicial acceptance
of lie-detector test results. He expressed the view that upon proof of
an examiner's competency and evidence of general scientific recogni-
tion, the test results should be accepted by the court. Justice Chappell
was of the opinion that the failure of the judiciary to embrace scien-
tific aids of this type "will only serve to question the ability of courts
to efficiently administer justice. '20
In a 1950 California murder case, People v. Wochnick,2 . the trial
court admitted as evidence the results of a specialized lie-detector
"peak of tension" test in which the defendant had been shown during
the test five knives, tested including the knife used in the murder.22
14 151 Neb. 368, 37 N.W. 2d 593 (1949).
15 Ibid., at 372 and 597.
16 Ibid. 19 Ibid.
17 Ibid. 20 Ibid., at 375 and 600.
18 Ibid. 2198 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70 (1950).
22The peak of tension test also was devised by Keeler. The subject in this case
was shown five knives and since he denied knowing whether any of the five were
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The defendant denied seeing any of the knives before, but the exam-
iner reported that he showed emotional reactions to the knife used in
the killing. It was also observed that the defendant closed his eyes
presumably for the purpose of avoiding any reaction when the fatal
knife was placed before him. The lie-detector examiner asked for
an explanation for the "fatal knife" reactions and the defendant said,
"I cannot explain that." The prosecution alleged that this statement
by the defendant was a tacit admission of having previously seen the
fatal knife. The California Court of Appeals reversed the conviction
on the grounds that lie-detector test results are inadmissible and also
on the grounds that a tacit admission of guilt was not made. The
court stated in its opinion that the lie-detector test had a prejudicial
effect on the jury and that the defendant's answer, "I cannot explain
that", did not indicate a consciousness of guilt or an acquiescence of
the truth of the examiner's statement regarding the reaction to the dis-
play of the fatal knife.
In a 1952 Texas forgery case, Peterson v. State,28 the defendant
offered evidence of a lie-detector test which indicated he was truthful
in his denial of the crime. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals sus-
tained the finding of the lower court in denying the admissibility of
lie-detector test results, stating that the test results were not admitted
at the present time as evidence for the prosecution and therefore they
could not be used on the defendant's behalf.
In the 1950 case of State v. Pusch,24 the defendant offered in evi-
dence the results of a lie-detector test as well as the testimony of a
hypnotist, both attesting to the defendant's innocence. The North
Dakota Supreme Court sustained the lower court's findings that the
used in the crime he was instructed to answer "no" to all the knives when asked
about them on the test. It appears the subject responded significantly to the actual
knife used in the crime and therefore was reported guilty by the examiner. The the-
ory of the peak of tension test is that if the subject knows beforehand that he is
going to lie on the one question, his blood pressure will build up to that question and
after the question is asked the blood pressure will drop gradually. The peak of the
blood pressure tension is considered the lie. In order for the peak of tension to be
reliable, the knife actually used in the crime is mixed in with the other knives and
the subject disclaims all knowledge of the actual knife used in the crime. If he has
peculiar knowledge regarding the "real" crime knife, his blood pressure peak of
tension will expose him.
28247 SAV. 2d 110 (Tex. Cr. App., 1952).
2477 N.D. 860, 46 N.W. 2d 508 (1950?.
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results of a lie-detector test as well as the testimony of the hypnotist
were inadmissible as evidence.
In 1951 a similar attempt was made in an Oklahoma case, Hender-
son v. State,25 where the defendant offered the lie-detector test results
as well as the results of a truth serum26 test to prove his innocence.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower courts, refusing both types of evidence, and concluded that
• . . neither the lie detector nor the truth serum test have gained that standing
and scientific recognition nor demonstrated that degree of dependability to
justify the courts in approving their use in the trial of criminal cases. 27
A rare and unusual offering was made in a 1945 Missouri case, State
v. Cole.2" The defendant, who was charged with the murder of a
seven-year-old girl, made a motion at the beginning of the trial that
all witnesses in the case be given lie-detector tests and that he, the
defendant, would also submit to the test. The trial court denied the
motion and also refused the defendant permission to take a lie-
detector test. The Missouri Supreme Court, in addition to holding that
the lie-detector technique had not gained sufficient recognition of its
efficacy to warrant judicial acceptance, stated:
In our opinion the day has not come when all the witnesses in a case can be
subjected to such inquisitorial and deception tests (or to drugs like scopola-
mine, or to hypnotism) without their consent. Furthermore, such dramatics
before the jury would distract them and impede the trial-this latter also be-
cause it is necessary for the inquisitor to ask both harmless, irrelevant and
"hot" questions in order to bring out the contrast in the witness' emotional
responses. No doubt the lie detector is useful in the investigation of crime,
and may point to evidence which is competent; but it has no place in the court
room.
29
The lower court's decision, as well as the expression of the Missouri
Supreme Court, indicated they were fully aware of the impact this
motion by the defendant would have if the lower court allowed the
defendant's request. From a lie-detector examiner's practical view-
point, tests given to witnesses against their will would most likely be
inconclusive in their indications and no real value would be derived
25 230 P. 2d 495 (Okla. Cr. App., 1951).
26 An intravenous injection of scopolamine or sodium amytal in theory releases the
subject's inhibitions to lie and therefore he tells the truth. It is quite controversial
as to the true value of truth serum.
27 Henderson v. State, 230 P. 2d 495, 506 (Okla. Cr. App., 1951).
28 354 Mo. 181, 188 S.W. 2d 43 (1945).
29 Ibid.7 at 189 and 51,
THE LIE DETECTOR IN COURT
from the tests except to unfairly benefit the defendant in the eyes of
the jury because of his spectacular request for the tests. Since lie-
detector tests under the best conditions (i.e., where the subject volun-
teers for the test and offers reasonable cooperation) are a complex
procedure, it is inadvisable for anyone to be forced or required
against his will to take a lie-detector test.
Disastrous implications are aroused even at the mention before a
jury that the defendant has been given a lie-detector test. If the men-
tion is made by the defendant's counsel and objected to by the prose-
cution it is reasonable for the jury to assume that the defendant passed
a lie-detector test. If the prosecutor asks the question about the lie-
detector test and the defense counsel objects, the jury may assume the
defendant failed the test.
In a Florida case, Kaminski v. State,'30 the prosecution's chief wit-
ness had been subjected to a rigid and effective cross-examination
after which the prosecutor tried to reestablish the witness' credibility
by asking him if he had taken a lie-detector test. The trial court
allowed the question to be answered but on appeal this ruling was
held improper. The Florida Supreme Court considered the trial court's
ruling to be the equivalent of an outright admission of the test results
in evidence, which it was not authorized to do.
All the appellate courts that have had an opportunity to rule on the
issue have refused to accept lie-detector test results into evidence
when the test results are proposed over the objection of the opposing
counsel. There are a great number of unappealed trial court cases,
however, in which lie-detector test results have been admitted as evi-
dence over the objection of the opposing counsel. One of these is
People v. Kenny," a New York case, in which the defendant on trial
for robbery introduced the testimony of Father Walter Summers of
Fordham University regarding the results of a lie-detector test.' 2 Over
the objection of the prosecuting attorney, Father Summers was per-
3063 So. 2d 339 (Fla., 1953).
31 167 N.Y. Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S. 2d 348 (Crim. Ct., 1938).
32 Father Walter Summers, a Jesuit priest, who did considerable experimental work
at Fordham University developed the Fordham pathometer. This instrument records
the skin resistance changes only. Leaders in the field of lie detection will not accept
the pathometer or any one channel instrument which records only one phenomenon.
The polygraph is therefore the acceptable instrument in lie detection because in ad-
dition to the blood pressure and respiration recordings the polygraph also contains a
skin resistance channel which is the same or similar to the pathometer or any of the
other electrodermal instruments.
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mitted to testify that the defendant was telling the truth when he
denied committing the robbery and the defendant was found not
guilty. However, in a later New York case, People v. Forte3 3 an
accused murderer requested the court that he be given a lie-detector
test by Father Summers and that the latter be allowed to testify as he
did in the Kenny case. The trial court refused to do so, and the New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court without
mentioning the Kenny case. As the result of the Forte case decision
it is clear that lie-detector evidence is not admissible in New York
over the objection of the opposing counsel.
The first time lie-detector test results were admitted as evidence in
Illinois in a felony case was on February 18, 1953. The Honorable
Charles S. Dougherty, Justice of the Criminal Court of Cook County,
allowed the writer to testify, over the objection of the prosecutor, that
the defendant was telling the truth on a lie-detector test when he
denied knowing the automobile that he repaired in his garage was
stolen. The defendant was freed as the result of this testimony. The
writer also knows of three felony cases in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
where the judges in the Common Pleas Courts allowed lie-detector
test results into evidence over the objection of the opposing counsel.
None of these cases have ever been appealed.
ADMISSION .UPON AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION
Although the appellate courts have consistently refused to permit
lie-detector test results to be used as evidence over the objection of
opposing counsel, there are several decisions upholding the admis-
sibility of such evidence where the test was made pursuant to an
agreement and stipulation.
In 1948 the California District Court of Appeals, in the case of
People v. Houser,34 held the defendant to be bound by an agreement
he had made to permit the lie-detector test results to be admitted as
evidence. The court said:
It would be difficult to hold that defendant should now be permitted on this
appeal to take advantage of any claim that [the examiner] ... was not an expert
• . . and that such evidence was inadmissible, merely because it happened to
indicate that he was not telling the truth. ... .35
33 167 N.Y. Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (Crim. Ct., 1938), aff'd 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.
2d 31 (1938).
34 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (1948).
35 Ibid., at 691 and 942.
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The Michigan Supreme Court in the case of Stone v. Earp,36 in
1951, had a peculiar circumstance under which to rule on the stipula-
tion issue. During a nonjury trial to determine whether the plaintiff or
defendant was the owner of a certain motor vehicle, the trial judge
announced, "I am not going to decide this case until your clients take
a lie-detector test." He then continued the case and at the rehearing
both attorneys consented to allow their clients to submit to a lie-
detector test and abide by the results. The examiner reported that the
plaintiff was lying. Upon appeal the supreme court agreed with the
plaintiff that the trial judge erred in admitting the lie-detector test
into evidence.
The most liberal and the most progressive group of jurists regard-
ing the use of lie-detector test results are the judges of the Municipal
Court of Chicago. For the past twenty years at least twenty-five Jus-
tices of the Municipal Courts of Chicago have regularly admitted lie-
detector test results as evidence in criminal, quasi-criminal and in civil
cases. The cases in which they resort to such evidence are generally
those in which there is no evidence other than the contradictory testi-
mony of the parties-instances in which justice would best be served
by this additional assistance to the court. If the parties agree to the
test the court designates a lie-detector expert and the fee for the test is
borne by the party or parties who take the test, thereby relieving the
court of that expense. Upon completion of the test, a confidential
report is mailed to the judge for his deliberation and decision.
Preliminary hearing courts such as the Felony Court and Boys'
Court in Chicago regularly use lie-detector test results to assist the
judges in determining whether the defendant should be held over to
the Grand Jury or whether he should be freed. Again, when these
Chicago judges turn to the lie detector, they have very little evidence
upon which to otherwise reach a decision.
The lie-detector technique has made a noteworthy contribution in
the solution of bastardy cases. In these cases the mother of the illegiti-
mate child accuses the defendant of being the father. The defendant
may admit sexual relations with the mother but states that he believes
other men also had sexual intercourse with the mother during the con-
ception period and that therefore someone else may be the father.
Blood tests on the child and alleged father can only be used to exclude
the father if his blood type is different from that of the child. How-
36 331 Mich. 606, 50 N.W. 2d 172 (1951).
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ever, if the defendant's blood type is the same as the child's this evi-
dence means that the defendant is only one of thousands of men who,
by having the same type blood, could be the father. Lie-detector tests
on the mother can reveal the fact that the mother has had sexual inter-
course with other men during the period of possible conception and
most times when the mother is confronted with these lie-detector
records she will admit to sexual intercourse with other men.
During the past year the writer gave lie-detector tests in three Cook
County Criminal Court cases in which the prosecution and defense
agreed beforehand to permit the test results to be used as evidence.
Case #1, a murder trial before the Honorable John J. Lyons on
February 17, 1954. A defendant, accused of being the driver of the
getaway car after a murder took place, agreed and stipulated with the
prosecution that he would plead guilty and accept a twenty-year
sentence in the penitentiary if a lie-detector test indicated he was
guilty, and if the lie detector showed him to be innocent, he was to
be freed. The lie-detector test indicated the defendant to be guilty.
After first refusing to abide by his agreement, the defendant later ac-
cepted the twenty year sentence.
Case #2, a murder by strangulation case before the Honorable
Thaddeus Adesko on September 17, 1954. The court allowed opposing
counsel to enter into an agreement similar to the above described. In
this instance the results indicated the defendant was truthful when he
denied the strangulation of the woman, and the court set the de-
fendant free.
Probably the most famous of all cases in Illinois in which the lie
detector played a prominent part was the murder trial of Vincent
Ciucci. On July 8, 1954 the defendant petitioned the Chief Justice of
the Criminal Court of Cook County, Charles S. Dougherty, for a lie-
detector test. Upon an agreement and stipulation entered into be-
tween the defendant, his counsel and the State's Attorney, Judge
Dougherty ordered the test to be made. The petition which defense
counsel presented read as follows:
Your petitioner, VINCENT CIUCCI, Sr., respectfully represents unto this
Honorable Court,
1. That he is the defendant accused of murder in the above numbered in-
dictment and that he is innocent of the charge.
2. That lie-detectors have been proven to be accurate in determining when
a person is telling the truth or an untruth, when questions pertaining to mat-
ters at issue are asked of the accused.
THE LIE DETECTOR IN COURT
3. That the law holds that findings and results of a lie-detector examination
are inadmissible in evidence, and that said law is fully for the protection of the
accused.4. That your petitioner, the defendant herein, respectfully desires and offers
to waive his right of protection afforded him by law by submitting himself
to a lie detector examination and by agreeing that the results thereof may be
stipulated in the trial of his cause.
WHEREFORE your petitioner prays that this Honorable Court appoint
an independent technician to administer a lie detector examination on this pe-
titioner and to submit his findings to this court and that said findings may be
stipulated as part of the evidence in the trial of his cause.
The Acting State's Attorney of Cook County, Irwin D. Bloch,
submitted the following stipulation to the court, to the defendant and
to the defendant's attorney:
It is hereby agreed and stipulated between the defendant Vincent Ciucci,
Sr., in his own proper person, and Mr. William Gerber, counsel for the said
Vincent Ciucci, Sr., and John Gutknecht, State's Attorney of Cook County,
that the said Vincent Ciucci, Sr., shall submit to a lie detector test to be given
by John E. Reid on or about the 8th day of July, 1954, for the purpose of de-
termining whether the said Vincent Ciucci, Sr., killed his daughter Angeline
by shooting a .22 calibre rifle, or by setting fire to the premises at 3101 West
Harrison Street, causing her death by asphyxiation, for which offense Ciucci
is presently under indictment.
It is further stipulated that the results of the lie detector examination and
the formal opinion by the examiner, John E. Reid, be introduced as evidence
in the trial of said Vincent Ciucci, Sr., on the charge of murder in Indictment
54-481.
The expenses, if any, for the examination and for the testimony of the ex-
aminer shall be paid by the County of Cook.
It is further stipulated and agreed that the court shall be required to instruct
the jury regarding the terms of this agreement and stipulation. The court shall
also be required to further instruct the jury that they should not accept the
test results or the examiner's opinion as conclusive on the issue before them,
but that they are privileged to consider the results and examiner's opinion
along with all the other evidence in the case and give it, like any other evi-
dence, whatever weight and effect they think it reasonably deserves.
It is further agreed and stipulated that John E. Reid shall submit written
copies of the results and his opinion to counsel for the defendant and to the
State's Attorney of Cook County, after the test is completed.
Consenting to this lie detector examination the defendant, Vincent Ciucci,
Sr., knows and understands that he requests such examination on the petition
filed in the Criminal Court of Cook County on July 8, 1954, and the defendant
further knows and understands he has no legal compulsion to do so agree and
stipulate.
Although counsel for the defendant refused to sign the stipulation
and advised the defendant not to sign it, they both agreed in open
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court that the results of the lie detector were to be admitted as evi-
dence.
The results of the test on the defendant indicated he was not telling
the truth when he denied murdering his 4-year old daughter Angeline.
At his trial, the defendant's counsel objected to the admissibility of
the lie-detector test results, despite the defendant's prior agreement
and stipulation to abide by the test results. The trial judge, the Hon-
orable Richard B. Austin, ruled, however, that the test results were
admissible as evidence because of the defendant's agreement and
stipulation. During the trial the writer not only testified as to the test
results but also demonstrated the lie detector before the jury. The
defendant was found guilty of the murder and sentenced to 45 years
in the penitentiary. It does not appear that an appeal will be taken to
the Illinois Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The Chicago and Cook County courts have far surpassed the courts
of any other city in the world in the use of the lie-detector technique
and many of the Chicago judges are convinced that within the next
decade lie-detector test results should be admitted as evidence. In
view of the Chicago area courts' usage of the lie-detector technique
for many years, as well as the judges' evaluation of the advantages of
the tests, have the courts in general hampered the administration of
criminal law by their refusal to accept lie-detector test results as evi-
dence? The answer, of course, is "no," when the lie-detector test
results are offered over the objection of the opposing counsel. How-
ever, the writer is firmly convinced that lie-detector test results should
be admitted as evidence upon an agreement and stipulation entered
into beforehand by opposing counsel. Under such a procedure all
objections to the general admissibility of lie-detector test results are
removed. The operator as well as the type of instrument to be used
are agreed upon before the test, which assures competency and hon-
esty on the part of the examiner. Furthermore, in such instances the
technique is used to settle disputes and issues not solvable by the con-
ventional methods of proof.
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